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Executive Summary 
The horror of 9/11 alerted the nation of the potential manmade threats to our nation’s homeland 
security. It created a heightened security consciousness at all levels of government and in all 
modes of transportation. Extreme weather events such as Hurricane Katrina of 2005 and 
subsequent storms including Rita, Gustav and Ike have reinforced a basic fact in Southern 
Louisiana: we live in a region that is extremely vulnerable to major natural disasters. People who 
live and work along the Gulf Coast are subject to recurring storms with damaging and sometimes 
catastrophic results. The 2005 storms impacted 19 parishes in Louisiana and affected the entire 
Lower Mississippi River (LMR) corridor downriver from Baton Rouge to the Head of Passes. 
These two hurricanes impacted the 5 states that border the Gulf of Mexico and were the costliest 
disasters in the history of the United States. 
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010 demonstrated the challenges our region faces when a 
manmade disaster strikes our off-shore energy fields.  This oil spill impacted the entire Gulf 
Coast (5 states), the nation’s and region’s economy and our fragile coastal environment. It was 
the worst environmental disaster in the history of the United States. 
These events point out our region’s strengths and weaknesses when it comes to disaster 
preparedness and post-disaster recovery. All sectors were involved in the response to these 
catastrophes. All available and appropriate assets were put to use during rescue and 
response activities. In both disasters, natural and manmade, key roles were played by assets of 
our ports and our region’s maritime sector. Appendix A identifies assets currently available at 
the LMR’s five deep water ports that can be used in times of disaster, assesses their availability 
in these instances and under what terms and conditions.  
In looking at the multiple issues involved in disaster response in South Louisiana, it becomes 
apparent that maritime assets comprise a small but important part of the solution for our region. 
To effectively confront these multiple threats, active participation and engagement needs to 
occur with a number of other affected entities and organizations including: the Governor’s Office 
of Homeland Security; municipal organizations responsible for police, fire and emergency 
response personnel along the LMR corridor; volunteer fire brigades; industrial response teams; 
private sector salvage and firefighting contractors. In short, in our region we need “all hands / all 
assets / all response” to confront our multiple threats. 
Post 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina many improvements have been made to our response and 
recovery abilities. New equipment, new operating policies / procedures, improved plans and 
additional resources are now in our region. What is lacking is an effective and overarching plan 
and process to effectively utilize these combined resources in times of disaster. This is currently 
being addressed by federal, state and local entities but much remains to be done to make their 
efforts a functioning reality. This initial research project is just the tip of the iceberg when it 
comes to disaster response and recovery in the LMR. 
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Research Questions   
 
As both the hurricanes of 2005 and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill illustrate, the Lower 
Mississippi River (LMR) is repeatedly impacted by large-scale disasters, both natural and 
manmade.  In many cases, assets of the (LMR) public ports from Baton Rouge to the Gulf of 
Mexico are routinely called into service. This is mandated more by necessity rather than by 
planning. The federally mandated USCG’s Area Contingency Plan (ACP) was found to be 
incomplete and/or outdated according to the recent Deepwater Horizon ISPR. This situation is 
currently being addressed by USCG Sector New Orleans. 
 
This research paper will address 2 fundamental questions: 1) What assets do the public deep 
water ports within the Lower Mississippi River (Baton Rouge to Head of Passes) possess that 
could be used during an emergency or maritime disaster? 2) Do agreements currently exist 
between the various ports, federal, state and local entities to access these assets in times of need? 
 
1.1  Significant Findings 
 
 Post-Katrina the Lower Mississippi River (LMR) corridor has greatly improved 
its ability to respond to disasters and emergencies with strategic acquisitions of 
equipment and related resources directed at disaster resilience, maritime security 
and communications. Funds were provided from multiple federal sources (DHS / 
FEMA). 
 Facilities at the LMR ports continue to be improved, reconstructed and storm-
proofed in preparation for future storms and related disasters.  
 The LMR corridor (downriver from Baton Rouge to the Head of Passes at the 
Gulf of Mexico) is currently being connected with an integrated, interoperable 
and non-commercial communication system strategically deployed at the 5 deep 
water ports’ Maritime Security Operations Centers (MSOC). These new 
operations centers are at various stages of completion but when they become fully 
operational they will greatly improve post-disaster communications and maritime 
security along the entire corridor. 
 LMR ports have entered into multiple Memorandum of Agreements or similar 
legal documents to authorize use of selected port assets in times of emergency by 
federal, state and local entities. A broader and more overarching agreement 
should be developed to cover all ports and their individual assets. 
 Several organizations have been formed Post-Katrina to address common 
concerns and acquire needed assets for disasters and emergencies. However, there 
is no overarching authority that manages their individual actions nor is charged 
with the over-all security of the corridor.  
 The USCG Sector New Orleans Area Contingency Plan (ACP) is currently 
undermanned and under resourced, as was pointed out in the Deepwater Horizon 
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ISPR Final Report. Discussions are on-going with USCG District 8 and Sector 
New Orleans to rectify this deficiency. 
 Industry led table top exercises are excellent tools for training in emergency 
preparedness and disaster response. Unfortunately, participation from parish 
officials, municipal fire fighters, and emergency response personnel is an ongoing 
problem. 
 Participation in ACP meetings by ports, parish officials and emergency response 
personnel are infrequent and insufficient at best.  
1.2 Recommendations 
 
 The USCG Sector New Orleans ACP must be updated and maintained with 
current information, as recommended in the “Deepwater Horizon ISPR Final 
Report”. 
 
 A senior member of USCG Sector NO needs to be assigned to the ACP with sole 
responsibility for its maintenance and update. In the recent past one LCDR was 
tasked with both Incident Response and the management of the ACP.  This 
proved unworkable. 
 
 The entire response community and the planning process it employs require a 
paradigm shift from being oil-spill centric into an “all-hazards” mindset. 
 The existing USCG Sector New Orleans ACP process must be incentivized to 
assure the participation of all affected parties: particularly the ports, municipal 
officials and emergency response personnel. Table-top exercises, even informal 
and small scale, are invaluable to the planning process. 
 
 Salvage and Marine Fire Fighting (SMFF) training needs to become a priority 
with USCG District 8 as well as Sector NO, the newly formed SMFF 
subcommittee of the ACP, at GOHSEP and similar offices at the municipal level.   
The focus of the ACP should be all hazards, not just oil spill-centric. 
 
 With Salvage and Marine Fire Fighting as a new Annex to the ACP, the recently 
formed SMFF subcommittee has been reenergized to add their experience and 
expertise to the formulation and improvement of the overall ACP. Their initial 
focus should be on assessing and training appropriate personnel at all levels of 
government based on their current status. 
 
 The State should assume a leadership role in building multijurisdictional 
partnerships for marine disaster / emergency response. GOSHEP and the LA Oil 
Spill Coordinators Office should coordinate this effort.  
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 DHS / FEMA recently presented a Congressional Justification for State and Local 
Programs. This document clearly points out that all assets in a region should be 
included in any and all emergency preparedness plans or procedures. (This has 
been the overriding philosophy behind this current UNOTI research project.) The 
specific language included in the presentation is included below: 
 
“As part of the peer review process, all EMHS resources will be considered in the context of 
their availability and utility to multiple jurisdictions, regions and the nation. The peer review 
process will require that resources, regardless of funding source, are complementary and that 
mutual aid and similar agreements allow for their use across jurisdictional boundaries for a wide 
range of threats and hazards. This will aid in preventing the use of federal funds to replicate 
capabilities that are in close proximity. Jurisdictions must also maintain membership in the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to facilitate the mutual aid of capabilities 
in order to be eligible for funding.”  (DHS/FEMA State and Local Programs 2013 Congressional 
Justification)  
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2.0 Recent Disasters Affecting the Lower Mississippi River, the 
 New Orleans Region and the Central Gulf of Mexico Coast 
2.1 Hurricane Katrina:  
On August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the costliest disaster in US history, hit the Lower 
Mississippi River at Buras, LA. with a 22’ storm surge. This wall of water virtually obliterated 
this small river town roughly 60 miles downriver of New Orleans while flooding 90% of 
Plaquemines Parish. Surges from the storm also caused horrific damage, destruction and death in 
New Orleans and surrounding parishes. Waters from the storm caused federal flood walls to fail 
(50 individual breaches) and levees to over top.  In Louisiana, the magnitude of the storm 
affected hundreds of thousands of residents and caused billions of dollars of damage. Residents 
of New Orleans’ East Bank  were evacuees for months and in some cases years before returning 
to a forlorn and destitute shadow of their former city. Eighty percent of New Orleans was 
flooded. All municipal systems failed as did the communication network, which become a huge 
problem for all personnel engaged in disaster response. One-third of the Port of New Orleans 
was destroyed with over $100M in damages to facilities. Their tenant losses were estimated 
at$280 – $300 M (New Orleans port is getting over Katrina – New York Times 2006/01/03). 
Post-Katrina, city officials admitted that Emergency Response Plans in New Orleans were in 
name only. They were neither actionable nor implementable.  
New Orleans Flooding Post-Katrina: Sept. 4, 2005 
Map Credit: Earth Scan Laboratory at Louisiana State University 
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Immediately after the winds subsided, maritime assets were used to save lives and begin the 
recovery of the City and the region. The Chalmette ferry and other vessels (198 total), safe 
harbored at the Port of St. Bernard’s Chalmette Slip, transported thousands of residents to safety 
in Lower Algiers, an area of city on the West Bank, which did not flood. The “Cajun Navy”, an 
all-volunteer flotilla from parishes west of the New Orleans, used recreational boats trailered to 
New Orleans to save more than one thousand stranded citizens post-Katrina.  
The Chalmette Slip: Normal Operations 
Photo Credit: Port of St. Bernard 
 
The Mississippi River’s main channel, once cleared of obstructions, became a virtual lifeline for 
New Orleans and the region. It provided a safe water route for vessels, first responders, critical 
military assets, civilian personnel, equipment, relief supplies, and cargoes.  Two MARAD Ready 
Reserve ships, permanently moored at New Orleans’ Poland Avenue Wharf, were immediately 
converted to multi-use disaster response centers.  Trained crews (both military and civilian) used 
these vessels and numerous other ships as a base for operations and control centers. All these 
vessels provided vital housing, medical facilities and a host of related recovery uses in flood 
ravaged New Orleans. The amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) was berthed in the 
city of New Orleans where it served as the command and control center for Joint Task Force 
Katrina, the combined military effort to provide aid for the areas hit by Hurricane Katrina. 
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Military Support for Katrina Recovery on USS Iwo Jima 
U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Joshua T. Rodriguez 
 
All available maritime assets were put to use after the storm: vessels (military, commercial, 
industrial); berths and slips; wharves and warehouses; the Port of New Orleans’ (PONO) 
Administrative Building,  fireboats, administrative and emergency response personnel; etc. This 
was dictated by necessity, not according to any disaster plan at any level of government. At the 
Port of St. Bernard, Associated Terminals’ warehouse and office building were converted to 
Camp Katrina, a staging area for rescue operations, a safe haven for evacuees and an operations 
base for some first responders. Parish first responders used refineries as a base of operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Camp Katrina, Port of St. Bernard 
Photo credit: Associated Terminals  
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Hurricane Katrina also reinforced the importance of distant ports in overall disaster relief and 
response. The Port of Greater Baton Rouge, located roughly 100 miles upriver from New 
Orleans, became a hub of rescue and relief operations post-storm given its deep-water status and 
its connectivity to both highway and rail infrastructure. “The port was quickly inundated by 
diverted ships, residence ships and emergency supply ships. It became a staging area for 
emergency equipment, supplies, food, water and fuel being sent to the ports of New Orleans and 
St. Bernard and to Plaquemines Parish”. (Baton Rouge, LA. Boosts Interoperability with 
Regional Approach) Chandler Harris, 2008; Emergency)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baton Rouge MSOC 
  Courtesy: Port of Greater Baton Rouge 
 
However, the communication systems at the Port of Greater Baton Rouge were found wanting. 
To address this problem, the port recently completed a new $3.3 M Maritime Security 
Operations Center that is available to federal, state and local agencies to respond to incidents on 
the Mississippi River within the port’s jurisdiction.  This facility will also be able to work with 
sister ports located along the LMR using state-of-the-art non-commercial and interoperable 
communications systems “to insure that the operations and commerce on the Mississippi River is 
secured during emergency situations as well as strategic and industry assets are coordinated 
during maritime incidents.” When completed and fully operational, the MSOC system will cover 
the jurisdictions of the 5 deep water ports within the Lower Mississippi River.  
Cooperative endeavors include Tri-Parish Mutual Aid Agreement and the Joint Task Force 7 
(JTF7), a Counter Terrorism Task Force created by a MOU with the seven sheriff’s departments 
whose boundary lines border  the Mississippi River. The Sheriff’s offices of Ascension, East and 
West Baton Rouge, Point Coupee, West Feliciana and Iberville parishes are current members. 
The purpose and goal of JTF7 is to protect life, vital infrastructure and fulfill government and 
industrial regulations mandated by the federal government. (Baton Rouge Planning Commission: 
2011 Evaluation and Appraisal Report) 
 
Similar multi-jurisdictional efforts have been created post-Katrina to address security issues 
faced by the individual ports, industrial facilities and municipal providers. According to  The 
Lower Mississippi River Port Wide Strategic Security Council (PSSC), the “Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 added significant and specific documentation, 
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visitor identification, and self-protection responsibilities to ports and related facilities.  It created 
Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) that provide an industry/government mutual 
security framework under the direction of the (U.S. Coast Guard) Captain of the Port….During 
2007 the five contiguous deep water ports of the Lower Mississippi River formed a consortium 
to compete for Port Security Grant Program funding as a region for the benefit of the entire state 
and river system by strengthening security for these core ports.” (PSSC White Paper, 2007)  To 
date, PSSC has secured over $130M in PSGP grants for a wide array of equipment, computer 
hardware, software enhancements as well as training exercises.   
Maritime Security Operations Center  
Photo Credit: Port of St. Bernard 
 
The intent is to “create a barrier around the 300 mile port system as a cohesive security layer for 
this vital national port complex.” The envisioned result will enable “the Lower Mississippi River 
corridor to become the safest and most protected maritime complex in the world, with state of 
the industry security layers, processes, technology, and training. The coverage area will extend 
up to two miles on either side of the river. Over 200 Maritime Transportation Act (MTSA)-
regulated facilities within the ports will be within the security layer.” (PSSC White Paper, 2007) 
 
Post-Katrina, there has also been a concerted effort by LMR ports to stormproof their facilities. 
A recent addition is the Port of St. Bernard’s (PSB) 3 story Administrative and Security 
Complex, which opened in mid-2010. This building has been constructed to withstand hurricane 
force winds (140 mph) and its Maritime Security Operations Center (MSOC) is additionally 
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hardened with bullet resistant doors and concrete block walls. The building is equipped with a 
500 KW Generator that can operate all functions of the third floor for a period of 96 hours 
without refueling. The building also contains bedding, food and water that will sustain 25 people 
for 3 weeks. A recent MOU with the USCG has resulted in the PSB being able to offer in safe-
housing up to 15 members of the Port Assessment Team or other first responders. The MSOC is 
currently being upgraded and will serve as the nexus through which local, state and federal 
entities and their respective personnel can work together at a Command Center (accommodates 
20 persons). This facility will serve as the communications portal between the USCG, the LMR 
ports and the maritime community. The recently completed MSOC at the Port of Greater Baton 
Rouge, which opened in December 2011, will become part of an interoperable non-commercial 
communications system, augmented with portable communications towers spanning the entire 
Lower Mississippi River. This will aid all entities engaged in maritime security, disaster response 
and recovery. 
 
2.2 Deepwater Horizon: 
 
On the evening of April 20, 2010, an explosion aboard British Petroleum’s (BP) Deepwater 
Horizon off shore oil platform at the Macondo well resulted in the nation’s largest oil spill. This 
monumental man-made disaster again required the mobilization of the region’s and the Gulf 
Coast’s maritime assets to avert an environmental catastrophe. These included vessels of all 
types, firefighting and oil spill personnel and equipment; response teams from the USCG and 
EPA; etc.  In hindsight, it also highlighted both successes and failures in the nation’s response to 
this manmade environmental disaster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BP Deepwater Horizon Fire 
Photo Courtesy: Resolve Marine Group 
 
On June 14, 2010, the Coast Guard Commandant chartered an Incident Specific Preparedness 
Review for the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Specifics of this report are 
included in Appendix A, but the report specifically examined “the implementation and 
effectiveness of the preparedness and response to the BP Deepwater incident as it relates to the 
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National Contingency Plan, Area Contingency Plans, and other oil spill response plans” 
(Deepwater Horizon ISPR Final Report, pg. 1)  Of particular note relative to this research project 
is the following: “Although the approved response plan for the Macondo well was in 
compliance with Government standards for response capability to address a worst case 
discharge (WCD), there is a critical need to ensure that oil and gas facility response plans 
(OSRPs) and existing Area Contingency Plans provide for sufficient trained personnel, 
equipment, and response resources to address the WCD from any offshore drilling 
operation.” (Deepwater Horizon ISPR Final Report Executive Summary Pg. 3) 
Industry Led Initiatives: 
 
Partnerships with local industry are also extremely valuable in pre-disaster planning and 
preparedness, particularly when they are staged as events impacting the Lower Mississippi River 
or the LA coastline abutting the Gulf of Mexico. In the spring of 2011, Marathon Petroleum 
Company LP conducted their annual Corporate Emergency Response Team Spill Management 
Team exercise (in New Orleans and Tampa simultaneously) over a three day period in April. 
This extensive table-top exercise, conducted as an NCP response by design, involved 4 separate 
incidents impacting 2 different environments: a portion of the Lower Mississippi River (in 
proximity to their LA refinery) and Tampa Bay, FL. Each participant was given a briefing packet 
per scenario that included: background information; business unit response plans; regional 
contingency plans; Marathon Emergency Preparedness Procedure and Plans; Public Response 
and CERT tools and toolboxes; Community Response; Applicable federal, state and local 
regulations. Over the duration of this exercise Marathon personnel worked with USCG officials 
and other federal, state and local response personnel in emergency management practices, plans 
and procedures. Although hypothetical, these events were meant to have the potential to disrupt 
and seriously impact Marathon’s operations, the surrounding communities, and the communities’ 
lifestyle. At the invitation of USCG LCDR Dietrich, members of the UNO Transportation 
Institute research team served as observers during the table-top exercise in New Orleans. As has 
been previously noted, it remains extremely difficult to engage local officials and emergency 
response personnel in these events but their participation is crucial. “Every effort should be made 
to secure the right folks to be at the table and stay to the end” according to Pat McCaffrey, 
Emergency Manager and Marathon’s Team Leader during the recent New Orleans exercise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marathon Petroleum Industry Led Exercise 
Hotel Intercontinental: April 12-14, 2011 New Orleans, LA 
 12 
 
3.0  Federal Framework for Disaster Preparedness and Response 
Affecting Marine Environments: 
Multiple plans have been incorporated over the years into the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) to address natural and manmade disasters affecting the maritime sector. They include the 
unique circumstances of oil spills and/or marine fire response and salvage. To date the emphasis 
at the federal level has been primarily on oil spill response.  
40 CFR 300 to 399 (“Protection of Environment”) specifies the roles and responsibilities of 
federal agencies (USCG and EPA), the responsible party and related support resources that can 
be mobilized during a maritime disaster. These include the National Contingency Plan (NCP), 
the Regional Contingency Plan (RPC) and the Area Contingency Plan (ACP). In 2011, a Salvage 
Marine Fire Fighting Annex was added to the ACP but it remains in its infancy.  None of these 
plans explicitly specify the role of public ports or their assets in any formalized contingency plan 
at any level. This is an error or oversight on the part of the federal government.  
In addition, in 40 CFR 300.180 (see Appendix B) state and local officials involved in emergency 
preparedness and response, public health and the environment are encouraged to participate as 
part of the response structure as provided in the ACP. 40 CFR 300.185 (see Appendix C) further 
addresses the role of nongovernmental participants: specifically industry groups, academic 
organizations and others are encouraged to commit resources for response operations as 
identified in the ACP. However, as was noted in the Deepwater Horizon ISPR Final Report, the 
USCG Sector New Orleans’ ACP was found to be inadequate for this incident and deemed 
problematic due to numerous sections noted as “To Be Developed” (see Appendix A).   
3.1 Historical Development of the Federal Framework: 
The overall federal framework for maritime disaster preparation and response is established by 3 
existing and overlapping laws: 1) The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA); 2) the Port and 
Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (PTSA); 3) the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OCP).  The National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan or National Contingency Plan (NCP) is 
the US government’s blueprint for responding to oil spills and hazardous substance releases 
within the US, its waters, waterways and adjacent to the its shores. The main intent of the NCP is 
to provide overall coordination among the multiple responders and contingency plans that exist 
within various federal entities including the USCG and USEPA, state and local governments, the 
private sector, and response contractors.   
The first NCP, developed in 1968, provided a comprehensive system of accident reporting, spill 
containment and cleanup. It also established a response headquarters, a national reaction team, 
and regional reaction teams. Over the years the scope of the original NCP has been broadened to 
include hazardous substance spills as well as oil discharges, most recently in 1994, which 
addressed the oil spill provisions of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990.  
Area Contingency Plans have been developed for oil and hazmat spill responses as well as 
marine firefighting. They are jointly developed by Area Committees with federal, state, local, 
trustee, and industry responders for a specific geographic area and are required by the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 and the National Contingency Plan. OPA established 60 Coastal Area 
Committees, including 1 specific to New Orleans and the Lower Mississippi River. ACPs are 
 13 
 
based upon the NCP and the RCP. The general format for the ACPs have been developed by 
USCG headquarters but each Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) has a separate ACP whose 
Area Committee is required to exercise its plan under the guidance of the USCG every three 
years. 
3.2 ACP Problem Areas: 
As cited by numerous experts (Hammell and Jenson, 1998), the USCG has multiple units internal 
to their organization (oil spill, hazmat, salvage, firefighting, facility inspection, etc.) that have 
specific plans (i.e. NCP, RCP, ACP) and personnel assigned to them according to their area of 
responsibility.  However, communications and coordination between these units are minimal or 
lacking. Complicating matters, at USCG Sector New Orleans, communications between the 
USCG and the individual ports within the Lower Mississippi River, who are part of the Area 
Committee, are inconsistent as are communications with the municipal entities charged with 
emergency preparedness and disaster response. (Mitch Smith @ PSL 7/14/2011 interview)  A 
further problem, cited by the above mentioned experts, applies to ACP’s across the country: ACP 
membership is ad-hoc and voluntary (Hammell and Jenson, 1998) which is a constant challenge 
for the USCG.   “Getting the right people at the table, keeping them there and getting them to 
consistently participate” is an ongoing problem, according to LCDR Hannah, USCG Sector New 
Orleans. Having attended ACP meetings hosted by Sector New Orleans for the past year, I have 
observed that participation by parish officials, port personnel as well as emergency responders 
and municipal firefighters continues to be limited and inconsistent. 
As noted by Marathon Petroleum’s Pat McCaffrey, “Another problem area is inland rivers, 
which are managed by the USCG, but are technically under the jurisdiction of the USEPA. 
NOAA has developed detailed information for the USCG ACPs for coastal zones. However, 
when it comes to inland rivers, a similar effort is spotty, depending upon the particular region of 
the USEPA.”  
In an attempt to rectify some of these problem areas, the “One-Gulf Plan (OGP)” was presented 
by LCDR Bill Goetzee, USCG District 8 - New Orleans (deceased) as a Base Plan that 
incorporates Area Specific Plan information but one that ”is better and easier to use”. This plan 
includes 3 specific focuses: sensitive sites; communications & contacts; resources 
(OSRO/Salvage/Fire-Fighting).  It aims to coordinate across AC boundaries to create regional 
consistency with specific benefits to the vessel, pipeline and OCS plan-holders and responders 
(public and private sector). According to LCDR Goetzee, OGP is “A better plan with less work”. 
The OGP incorporates 6 separate FOSC areas from Corpus Christi to Mobile.  In his slide 
presentation: “One Gulf Plan Overview” LCDR Goetzee illustrates the Area Committee Process 
and the relationship between various plans regarding maritime disasters, response and recovery 
activities.  
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“The One Gulf Plan Overview” 2008 
   A Presentation by LCDR Bill Goetzee (deceased) 
   USCG District Eight - New Orleans 
 
According to Captain of the Port Gautier (USCG Sector New Orleans), “This is more theory than 
reality”. In his opinion, if implemented, OGP could actually cause more redundancy among the 
individual ACPs. It also might not do what it intends to do. As an overarching concept, it has 
validity, but it needs to take into account the individual characteristics of each ACP; especially 
with regard to the Geographic Response Plans. These need to be very site specific and they 
require the input of local leaders (both public and private sectors), NGOs as well as DEQ and 
Fish and Wildlife. In the Deepwater Horizon ISPR, the lack of specificity of these plans was 
noted as a major weakness. Captain Gautier also remarked that in other areas of the country, state 
offices of Environmental Quality and /or Fish and Wildlife contribute significant amounts of 
time and efforts to the Geographic Response Plans. This is currently not the case in LA. 
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Relationships of Various Response Plans 
   Credit: Resolve Marine Group 
 
In a recent interview with a member of the USCG Sector New Orleans SMFF subcommittee, it 
also was noted:  “The LMR needs an ‘all hands - all hazards’ response.  This is everyone’s 
desire, but it’s not reality yet.” (Matt Hahne Resolve Marine Group / New Orleans, Interview 
12/29/2011). As the above diagram illustrates, there exists, in theory, a significant overlap 
between the ACPs, the Facility Response Plans, and the Vessel Response Plans. However, in 
reality, there is little or no overlap. This is another deficiency that must be addressed as SMFF 
becomes an added responsibility of the USCG. 
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4.0  USCG Sector New Orleans 
 
Jurisdictional Boundaries 
Credit: USCG 
  
Individual Unit Locations  
 
USCG Sector New Orleans is responsible for a vast amount of area onshore as well as a number 
of inland waterways including the total length of the Mississippi River within Louisiana’s state 
boundaries as well as a portion of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico and its off-shore energy fields 
and soon all vessels traversing this area. The sheer size of their jurisdiction, its environmental 
diversity and the USCG’s multiple and ever-growing responsibilities continue to present 
challenges which may or may not be achievable. This situation calls for an active and meaningful 
partnership with governmental entities at all levels, the private sector, and independent 
contractors charged with SMFF responsibilities to enable the USCG to partner and benefit from 
the resources of the private sector within their sphere of influence. 
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Appendix A: 
LMR Port: Plaquemines Parish Port, 124 Edna LaFrance Road, Braithwaite, LA 70040 
Jurisdiction: 0 AHP (Southwest Pass Buoy) to 81.5 AHP , Coterminous with Plaquemines Parish Boundaries  Memorandum of Understanding in Effect: 
PSSC; CEA with Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Office (use of helicopter); Agreement with PSB for safe-harboring of Authority III for Cat. 2 Hurricane; 
Agreement with PSL for 1 50’ vessel to moor at their facility 
port assets quantity 
contact 
number trailers location crew speed purpose 
17' Diamondback Airboat (no 
phone) 1 NA 1 
Belle Chase 
VFD as needed 40 kts Search & Rescue 
18' Alumaweld Flatboat 1 NA 1 
Belle Chase 
VFD as needed 35 kts Search & Rescue 
50' fireboat (Authority I) 1 
504-912-
3991 na Mile 75 AHP  
2 persons 
24/7 25 knots Fire Fighting 
50' fireboat (Authority II) 1 
504-912-
3981 na 
USCG Station 
Venice 
2 persons 
24/7 25 knots Fire Fighting 
90' fireboat (Authority III) 1 
504-715-
6913 na Mile 75 AHP  
2 persons 
24/7 
18 knots 
currently; 
23 knots 
when fully 
operational Fire Fighting 
30' rescue / fire boat 1     
Mile 75 AHP 
Eastport 
staffed as 
needed 40 knots 
Fire Fighting (in shallow waters / 
trailerable) 
30' rescue / fire boat 1     
Mile 75 AHP 
Westport 
staffed as 
needed 40 knots 
Fire Fighting (in shallow waters / 
trailerable) 
tilt-bed truck 1     
Belle Chase 
VFD / 
Woodlawn       
Sunstrom 480B helicopter with 
cargo hook, Spectra Lab SX-5 
searchlight; Gyrocam DS 
Infrared camera system 1     
PP Sheriff 
Office     Incident Response 
Mobile Communications and 
Surveillance Unit 1             
Pickup trucks 4             
80' mobile communications 
tower 1     Mile 75 AHP      
Portable Communcation Tower 
(trailerable to site)  
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Plaquemines Parish Port, Page 2 
pumps 
eductor 
pumps 
discharge 
lines fire hoses 
foam 
concentrate 
dry 
chemical  
diesel 
fuel 
fire 
extin- 
guishers 
line 
throwing 
gun 
defibri- 
llator 
stoke litters 
w/ backbone 
na             yes       
na                     
1,500 gals./min. 
2 @ 750 
gals./min. 
4 - 2.5" 
for hoses x 300 gallons   
600 
gallons  yes 1 1 2 
1,500 gals./min. 
2 @ 750 
gals./min. 
4 - 2.5" 
for hoses x 300 gallons   
 600 
gallons yes 1 1 2 
5,000 gals./min. 
thru 2 remote 
controlled 6" 
monitors 
mounted 38' 
above water: 2 
remote 
controlled 
wharf monitors 
+ 5 2" monitors  
manually 
operated     x 
1,000 gallon 
on-board 
capacity:  
currently 500 
gallons on-
board   
3900 
gallons 
  yes 1  1   
575 gals./min. 
thru 2 monitors     
1 2,000 
gallon / min. 
(portable) 7,000 gallons             
575 gals./min. 
thru 2 monitors     
1 2,000 
gallon / min. 
(portable) 7,000 gallons             
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
 19 
 
Plaquemines Parish Port, Page 3 
SCBA w/ 
spare 
tanks communications crane 
on-
board 
boat 
equipment / additional 
information 
personnel capabilities: 
16 volunteers on hand for 
Hurricane Response 
response / 
mobilization 
time 
  
1 Panasonic advanced 
hybrid telephone system   na 
30KW Diesel Generator, 3 
Coleman heat pump/air 
conditioning units     
      na       
5 
cell phones; 700/800mhz 
radios; VHF radios         
underway 
w/in 2-3 
min. (24/7) 
5 
cell phones; 700/800mhz 
radios; VHF radios         
underway 
w/in 2-3 
min. (24/7) 
7 
cell phones; 700/800mhz 
radios; VHF radios 1 / 2500 lbs. 
12' 
Zodiac 
hull w/ 
25hp 
outboard     
underway 
w/in 5-7 
min. (24/7) 
              
              
              
  
CB radio; Marine VHF; Wi-Fi 
image transmission            
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LMR Public Port: St. Bernard Port, 100 Port Boulevard, Chalmette, LA 70043 
Jurisdiction: 81.5 AHP to 91.5 AHP (Orleans Parish Line), Coterminous with St. Bernard Parish Boundaries 
Memorandum of Understanding in effect: USCG safe-housing for 15 Port Assessment Team members or emergency response personnel 
port assets quantity 
contact 
number trailers location crew speed purpose 
Administration and Security 
Complex (SBP has no vessels as 
they are within the jurisdiction 
of the PONO (daily patrol) 1 
504-277-
8418 na 
89.5 ahp 
Chalmette, 
LA na na 
office space + 20 person command center + 2000 
sf secondary command center as required 
Chalmette Slip offered natural 
safe  harbor for 198 vessels 
during Hurricane Katrina; No 
access points or boom at SBP. 1     90.7 ahp       
Tour Boat Dock @ Battlefield 
(Chalmette National Park) 1     90.0 ahp      
Allows Paddlewheels to dock at Chalmette 
National Park   
Passenger Barge for 
Paddlewheels at Battlefield 1     90.0 ahp      
Allows passengers to visit the Chalmette  
National Park 
Maritime Security Operations 
Center (MSOC) for St. Bernard / 
Plaquemines Parish 1 
504-342-
6289 na 
89.5 ahp 
Chalmette, 
LA na na 
Maritime security / communication hub serves as 
the portal between USCG, ports and maritime 
sector. Accommodates up to 9 Unified 
Commanders and up to 16 additional 
Officers/Personnel for up to 3 weeks without 
outside intervention 
Chalmette Mid-Stream Mooring   1     89.5 ahp        
Meraux Mid-Stream Mooring F 2     86.5 ahp        
Underwater Inspection System 1   89.5 ahp na na  
Mobile Communications Tower 
(80’) with generator on trailer 1 
504-342-
6289  1 89.5 ahp na na  
Mobile Communications and 
Surveillance Unit 1 
504-342-
6289 1 89.5 ahp   
Rapid response, surveillance, assessment and 
hazard mitigation 
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St. Bernard Port, Page 2 
pumps 
eductor 
pumps 
discharge 
lines fire hoses 
foam 
concentrate 
dry 
chemical 
diesel 
fuel 
fire 
extin- 
guishers 
line 
throwing 
gun 
defibri- 
llator 
stoke litters w/ 
backbone 
SCBA w/ 
spare tanks 
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St. Bernard Port, Page 3 
communications crane 
on-
board 
boat equipment / additional information personnel capabilities 
response / 
mobilization 
time 
12 portable 700/800 MHz 
radios, T-1 internet     
Construction completed in 2010. Designed to 
withstand 140 mph winds. Equipped with 500 KW 
Power Generator capable of operating all functions on 
the 3rd floor for 96 hours without refueling. Capable of 
housing and feeding 25 people for 3 weeks. Agreed to 
provide USCG safe-housing for 15 members of the Port 
Assessment Team or other responders as deemed 
appropriate     
connection and 
broadband connection     
 
    
            
            
      
Hardened with level 3 bullet resistant doors and 
concrete block walls; Serves as the central point of 
communications for the maritime sector within the 
Lower Mississippi River      
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LMR Public Port: Port of New Orleans,  1350 Port of New Orleans Place, New Orleans, LA 70130 
Jurisdiction: 81.2 AHP to 114.9 AHP 
Memorandum of Understanding in effect: With LA State Police for use of the Admin. Building; With NOPD to store up to 2 18 wheelers at Poland 
Street Wharf 
port assets quantity 
contact 
number trailers location crew speed purpose 
PONO Administration 
Building 1 
504-528-
3251 no 95.7 ahp na na office space, etc. 
mobile command 
center; 45ftx34ft 2007 
Freightliner, 56,00 lb. 
300 H.P. turbo-charged 
diesel 1 
504-891-
7585 no 
Julia Street 
Substation (95.4 
ahp) 
1 
Driver na Command and Control 
Capt. Kenneth H. 
Scarbrough 50x16 ft. 
Dauntless Class River 
Patrol Boat; Twin 5016-
V 875 Caterpillar Diesels 1 
504-891-
7585 no 
Harbor Police HQ 
(#1 Third St. Wharf; 
98.0 ahp) 3 
Max: 30 
knots 
Waterborne Patrols, Facility surveillance; 
Crime Interdiction /Emergency Response 
Fire Boat Kelley (Multi-
Purpose Public Safety 
Vessel; 95x26 ft. 7 ft. 
Draft; 3600 HP total  
(4 main engines) 1 
504-897-
6844 no 
Harbor Police HQ 
(#1 Third St. Wharf; 
98.0 ahp) 3 
Max: 
20+knots Fire Fighting / Law Enforcement / Protocol 
#5320 21' Boston 
Whaler with 200 hp 
outboard 1 
504-891-
7585 1 
Julia Street 
Substation; 95.4 
ahp 3 
Max. 20 
knots 
Law Enforcement / Facility Inspection: 
During Katrina used for Search and Rescue 
in the Lower 9th Ward 
#5310 16' flat boat with 
90 hp outboard 1 
504-891-
7585 1 
Julia Street 
Substation (95.4 
ahp) 2 
Max. 15 
knots 
Law Enforcement / Facility Inspection: 
During Katrina used for Search and Rescue 
in the Lower 9th Ward 
Port of New Orleans,   Page 2 
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pumps 
eductor 
pumps 
discharge 
lines fire hoses 
foam 
concentrate 
dry 
chemical 
diesel 
fuel 
fire 
extin- 
guishers 
line 
throwing 
gun 
defibri- 
llator 
stoke 
litters w/ 
backbone 
SCBA 
w/ 
spare 
tanks 
na na na na na               
na na na na na               
      yes       yes         
2 North 
American Model 
16HJ3 three 
stage water jets, 
operated 
through 
diversion valve 
into water main 
system, variable 
PSI settings   
4 Stang 2500 
GPM fire 
monitors; 3 
Stang 
1000GPM 
under wharf 
fire monitors 
yes 
various 
lengths 
and 
diameters 
2000 gallons of 
Ansulite 3X3 Low 
Viscosity Alcohol 
Resistant AFFF 
Concentrate 
delivered from 2 
2500 GPM fire 
monitors and/or 
3 hose 
connections     yes     yes yes 
                        
                        
 
Port of New Orleans,   Page 3 
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communications crane 
on-
board 
boat equipment / additional information 
personnel 
capabilities 
response / 
mobilization 
time 
12 CO lines and 8 extension lines     
1 Sony 32" flat screen HDTV, 4 15" flat panel TVs, 2 LCD 
flat screen monitors; 1  23" LCD flat panel TV, 1 14" 
TV/VCR/DVD TV, 1 DVD recorder, 1 Winegard 
omnidirectional antenna     
8 Panasonic telephone sets; 3 
cellular phones, 4 mobile CB 
Radios; 3 VHF mobile marine 
radios; 4 Motorola Model XTL 
digital mobile radios     
1  mobile roof-mounted satellite dish, 1 Pelcot Esprit 
mast-mounted color camera; 6 Dell Note Books Model 
Ispiron 6400, 1 Dell 964 All in One printer scanner copier     
2 VHF Marine radios; Motorola 
digital radios     
Thermal imaging camera system, Closed circuit 
television with audio/video recorder, Portvision 
ASI/Vessel tracking system, Satellite television and 
telephone; Garmin GPS/Chart Plotters, 2 x-band marine 
radars, XM WX satellite weather receivers; 4 32" LCD 
computer display monitors; Full First Aid response 
package, Sea Rescue platform 8 feet deep X 25 feet 
wide, one foot above waterline; 1 3000lb capacity crane 
onboard;      
2 Motorola Model H 5058 R VHF 
radios Motorola digital radios 
1 3000 
lb. on-
board 
16' 
rescue 
boat Storage space for 500 feet of oil containment boom     
            
            
 
 
LMR Public Port: Port of South Louisiana, 171 Belle Terre Boulevard, LaPlace, LA 70068 
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Jurisdiction: 114.9 AHP to 168.5 AHP 
Memorandum of Understanding in effect: PSSC, JTF7 
port assets quantity 
contact 
number trailers location crew speed purpose 
The John James Charles 
Fireboat, 80' x 16.5' 1 
866-536-
3678; 985-
536-3678 na 164.0 ahp  3 12 knots 
Fire Fighting / Multi-Purpose. Can be 
used as staging platform and 
transportation of additional 
Emergency Response Personnel and 
Equipment. 
The Accardo; 49' Dauntless-
class patrol boat 1 
866-536-
3678; 985-
536-3678 na 138.0 ahp  3 
Max: + 30 
knots 
Port Security / Search and Rescue / 
Fire Fighting (1500 GPM) 
The PSL Responder Security 
Command Boat; 57' x 16' 
(4.5' draft) 1 
866-536-
3678; 985-
536-3678 na 138.0 ahp 3 
Max: + 30 
knots; 1750 
hp 
Port Security / Command and Control 
/ Limited Fire Fighting / Equipped 
with Echoscope 3D Sonar 
Zodiac RHIB; 27' on trailer 1 
866-536-
3678 1 Reserve, LA 
3 (6 
passengers) 50+knots 
SAR / Law Enforcement / Equipped 
with Echoscope 3D Sonar 
Ford Expedition 4x4 1 
866-536-
3678; 985-
536-3678 na Reserve, LA 2 na 
Control + Communications; Law 
Enforcement 
Chevrolet 3500 Pickup 1 
866-536-
3678; 985-
536-3678 na Reserve, LA 
1 driver; 3 
passengers na 
Control + Communications; Law 
Enforcement 
MSOC (under development)  1 
985-536-
3678         
Maritime security, Operations, 
System-wide communications 
Port of South Louisiana, Page 2 
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pumps 
eductor 
pumps 
discharge 
lines 
fire 
hoses 
foam 
concentrate 
dry 
chemical 
diesel 
fuel 
fire 
extinguishers 
line 
throwing 
gun defibrillator 
stoke 
litters w/ 
backbone 
SCBA 
w/ 
spare 
tanks 
 
                      
1,500 gpm 
capacity                       
 
                      
na                       
na na na                   
                        
                        
 
 
 
 
Port of South Louisiana, Page 3 
The John James Charles has a total pumping capacity of 5,500 gpm. Appropriate size suction and discharge hoses from 1.5 inch 
to 5 inch. Equipment includes eductors, fire extinguishers, SCBA’s, defibrillators and personal protective equipment for assigned 
crew.  
 
The PSL Accardo has 1,500 gpm pumping capacity with appropriate suction and discharge hoses from 1.5 inch to 3.0 inch.  
Equipment includes eductors, fire extinguishers and personal protective equipment for assigned crew. 
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communications crane 
on-
board 
boat equipment / additional information personnel capabilities 
response / mobilization 
time 
800 / 700 MHz State 
System 
VHF-FM Marine Radio 
Cell Phone 
Sat Phone     
PSL is on the state wide 800/700 MHz 
radio system capable of 
communicating with multiple 
response and law enforcement 
agencies; PSL maintains an 24/7/365 
Communications and Response 
Capability 
SAR, Marine Fire 
Fighting, Pollution and 
Hazmat Response; Law 
enforcement 
personnel also 
available to respond to 
specific incident or 
event  Immediate 
            
Presently undergoing 
C+C equipment 
upgrades     
(2) Icom VHF-FM marine radio; (2) 
Furuno Nav-Nat 24 mile radar with 
color display; AIS monitoring; 
Teledyne Solutions Interoperable 
Communications System with Wi-Fi, 
CCTV. Infrared cameras     
      
available for deployment in area 
lakes, canals and bayous     
      
8,000 lb. towing capacity / full array 
of communication systems     
      
10,000 lb. towing capacity / full array 
of communications systems     
  
700/800 
MHz   
 The PSL maintains an annual contract 
with Southland Fire and Safety in 
Gonzales, LA to provide up to 10,000 
gals. Of foam concentrate with a 2 
hour delivery time within its 
jurisdictions 24/7/365. 
Staffing varies per 
event. MSOC's are 
governed by and 
follow the command of 
the USCG Captain of 
the Port.   
 
 
 
LMR Public Port: Port of Greater Baton Rouge,  2425 Ernest Wilson Drive,  Port Allen, LA 70767-6176 
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Jurisdiction: 168.5 AHP (Sunshine Bridge) to 253 AHP (ExxonMobil Refinery): includes the parishes of Ascension, East Baton Rouge, Iberville; and West 
Baton Rouge (85 miles total) 
Memorandum of Understanding in effect: MSOC -- JTF7;  Exxon-Mobil Refinery (Industry Partner)--incident specific response capability via Kirby Marine; 
On call as needed 
moveable assets quantity 
contact 
number trailers location crew speed purpose 
                
Port of Greater Baton Rouge   225-342-5378           
MSOC--JFT7 1 TBD   229.0 ahp     
port security / maritime 
operations / communications 
nexus 
Exxon-Mobil Refinery fire barge: 
"The Volunteer” 1 225-931-3899 na 
Exxon-Mobil 
Refinery Dock; 
N. Baton Rouge, 
LA 
30 normal 
conditions  na area-wide marine fire-fighting  
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pumps 
eductor 
pumps 
discharge 
lines 
fire 
hoses 
foam 
concentrate 
dry 
chemical 
diesel 
fuel 
fire 
extinguishers 
line 
throwing 
gun defibrillator 
stoke 
litters w/ 
backbone 
                      
                      
                      
(2) 4000 gpm diesel 
firewater pumps; (1) 
2000 gpm Patriot 
Monitor for water, 
foam or dry chemical 
delivery; (3) 1000 gpm 
Sharpshooter 
monitors; (3) 1250 
portable monitors       
2120 gallons 
Thunderstorm 
foam 
900 lbs. 
Williams 
PKW Dry 
Chemical 
620 
gallons 
on-
board         
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SCBA w/ 
spare 
tanks communications crane 
on-board 
boat equipment / additional information 
personnel 
capabilities 
response / 
mobilization time 
              
              
  
interoperable non-
commercial systems     facility currently under construction     
  
Privately-owned and 
operated radio system     
Exxon Mobil is the only private 
facility that has their own FF 
equipment in Baton Rouge (the 
“Volunteer” fire barge) 
 POC: Obie Combre @ E/M 
Dimensions: 52' x 150'.  Includes a 
responder rehabilitation area, 
storage area for marine firefighting 
equipment, non-skid deck. Sixty 
employees are fully trained and USCG 
certified for Marine and Shipboard 
Fire Fighting (NFPA 1405). Kirby 
Marine is under contract to provide 
motive force for responses and 
training.     
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Appendix B: Excerpts from Deepwater Horizon ISPR Final Report 
B.1 “Area Contingency Plans 
This report devotes a significant amount of attention to the state of Area Contingency Plans 
(ACPs) in the Gulf of Mexico. Overall, the team found these plans to be inadequate for this 
incident, and possibly for smaller, more localized incidents. The Coast Guard needs to provide 
service-wide direction to all Area Committees, develop minimum standards for contingency 
plans, and establish an oversight, review, and compliance program to ensure that minimum 
standards and consistency among plans are adequately addressed. It does not appear from 
research conducted by the team that this can be accomplished solely at the local (Sector) level, 
and may not be appropriate at the District level. The ACP development process has been ongoing 
for more than a decade. The team can find no reason to have critical gaps in any ACPs where 
some sections are noted as ‘To Be Developed.’ 
In the Gulf of Mexico or anywhere offshore oil production occurs, there must be direct linkage 
between the Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) and local ACPs. The ISPR Team found that not 
including worst case discharge (WCD) scenarios from offshore oil exploration, development, 
and production activities in ACPs for areas in which such activities are occurring was 
unacceptable. Both the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement must be able to verify that those engaged in such activities have the trained 
personnel, equipment, and other resources to meet WCD plan requirements. 
There are very few programs within the Coast Guard that facilitate direct communication and 
dialogue with State and local officials. The ACP development process is one of them. As 
evidenced by the last two major spill events, Cosco Busan and Deepwater Horizon, much of the 
external political pressure exerted upon the response organization was the direct result of not 
engaging local officials prior to and during the spill response. In the Deepwater Horizon incident, 
this was further complicated by a misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge of agencies’ 
responsibilities set forth in the National Contingency Plan (NCP). All of this could have been 
addressed, and possibly avoided, during the ACP development process. Until the Coast Guard 
takes proactive measures to bring State and local officials into this process, the Coast Guard 
should expect to have State and local politicians impacting response operations.” (pgs. 5-6) 
B.2 “General Findings and Recommendations: Funding 
The ISPR Team did not focus specifically on funding during the spill response. However, several 
recommendations within the report have potentially significant funding implications for both 
preparedness and response. These include additional funding for research and development, 
particularly as it relates to enhancing the means of locating, measuring, and removing oil, and 
alternative response technologies; incentives for local official and non-governmental 
organization participation in the ACP process; and others….. Regardless of the funding source, it 
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is imperative to understand that many of the recommendations provided in this report require 
additional or new funding. The Deepwater Horizon incident showed the response community 
and the public that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not carry the day in future spill events; 
neither will ‘funding as usual.” (pg. 8) 
B.3  “Area Committee Organization and Activity: Lessons Learned 
The ISPR Team decided to add a focus area to the report that discusses lessons learned 
categorically. While each focus area has its own Lessons Learned section, there were many on 
the team who felt a need to look back to prior spill events and exercises to see which lessons 
learned were, in fact, not really learned prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident. This was also 
done, to a degree, in Phase Two of the Cosco Busan ISPR report, citing lessons learned (but not 
institutionalized) from the Cape Mohican spill 11 years earlier. It is evident to the team that 
many critical lessons learned are not addressed programmatically or implemented effectively 
and, as such, had little role in enhancing the Coast Guard’s planning, preparedness, and response 
programs. The preeminent objective of conducting reviews of large spill events, and the conduct 
of large spill exercises, is to provide the Coast Guard with road signs that enable the Coast Guard 
to alter direction and shorten the travel to the desired destination. The Coast Guard needs to 
formally address lessons learned, institutionalize them through programmatic changes, and in 
some cases, through cultural changes. The Coast Guard should draw from lessons learned in this 
report, and institute an autonomous program, not unlike a private sector quality control program 
to select, implement, and assess the outcome of lessons learned.” 
(pg. 10) 
 
B.4 “Area Committee Organization and Activity: Discussion 
Prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident, the Sector New Orleans Area Committee was 
scheduled to meet annually. However, over the past 10 years the Committee only met seven 
times. The Captain of the Port (COTP) for Sector New Orleans chairs the Area Committee 
meeting. The charter membership, as listed in the ACP, includes: The Coast Guard, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, the Louisiana State 
Police’s Environmental Safety Section, the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office, Mississippi 
Office of Pollution Control, Mississippi Bureau of Marine Resources, and Mississippi 
Emergency Management Agency. The attendance records show that, in addition to the charter 
members, there was consistent attendance from the former U.S. Mineral Management Service 
(now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement [BOEMRE]), the 
petroleum industry, and the OSRO community. There is no indication that representatives from 
any local government or NGOs were ever present. The most recent version of the ACP for this 
region is dated August 2009. During the interview process for this report, when local NGOs and 
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local government officials were asked if they were aware of the Area Committee and the ACP 
process, they stated that they were not aware of this planning body and had never been invited to 
attend or participate in any way. However, when State and Federal officials were asked the same 
question, they thought invitations had been sent to local government officials and that no one 
from the local governments had accepted the invitation and attended. One Sector relied on the 
State representative to provide local input, if any.” (pg. 13) 
During the Deepwater Horizon incident, there was clear indication from individuals in local 
government that they were not familiar with oil spill response. Participation in the Area 
Committee planning process would have allowed local agencies to be much better informed 
about the process, and their presence would have strengthened the planning and preparedness 
throughout the Gulf region. (pg. 14) 
B.5 Area Committee Organization and Activity: Lessons Learned 
• Area Committees need to meet regularly and consistently to ensure that ACPs are up-to-
date, complete, and reflect current policy and doctrine. 
• The lack of local government participation in Area Committees had a negative effect on 
the Deepwater Horizon response due to limited understanding of the NCP, ACPs, and current 
response policy and doctrine on the part of representatives from the local government. Similarly, 
the establishment of an Area Committee outreach program would have enhanced preparedness in 
the Gulf region prior to the incident. 
• The response organization needs to accommodate local government interests in order to 
maintain unity of effort and ensure a coordinated response. 
• Formal minutes of Area Committees meetings will facilitate standardization of Area 
Committee deliberations and provide a record of Area Committee activities and discussions.” 
(pg. 14) 
B.6 Area Contingency Plan Policy and Implementation: Lessons Learned: 
• Although the NCP contains guidance for development of ACPs, additional policy 
guidance and protocol is necessary to assist Area Committees in developing comprehensive and 
functional ACPs. 
• There is not a well-established and standardized process for the identification and 
prioritization of environmentally sensitive or economically important areas that might be 
impacted by a spill. 
• Coast Guard Districts and Regional Response Teams should regularly participate in ACP 
review and approval in order to maintain consistency and effectiveness of plans for their 
particular geographic areas. 
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• ACPs should address critical elements of preparedness, including qualifications of 
personnel, training, exercises, and equipment; e.g., current inventory and availability of 
skimmers, boom, and other cleanup technologies. 
• A more proactive approach to crisis management that emphasizes contingency planning 
as a core component is mandatory for improving the Coast Guard’s preparedness program. 
B.7 Area Contingency Plans: Recommendations: 
• The Coast Guard should update its existing ACP policy guidance and provide increased 
oversight to ensure Area Committees are developing comprehensive and functional ACPs 
nationwide. 
•  The Coast Guard should ensure that critical ACP components required by the NCP and 
Coast Guard policy are incorporated into ACPs and clarified for Area Committees, including but 
not limited to WCD scenarios from OSRPs where appropriate; identification and prioritization of 
environmentally sensitive and economically important areas; near-shore containment strategies; 
offshore control and removal strategies; the identification of equipment, trained personnel, and 
response resources to implement the tactics and strategies for a WCD. 
 
•   The Coast Guard should request that the National Response Team review and revise the 
NCP as necessary to incorporate advances in response management and planning, including 
Incident Command System doctrine and prescribe mission assignments for a Spill of National 
Significance event. 
•   The Coast Guard should ensure that ACP policy provides for improved State and local 
participation in ACP development, including participation by industry and OSROs, and that it 
provides for familiarization of ACPs with senior officials in State and local governments. 
•   The Coast Guard should place more emphasis on contingency planning. It should be 
valued as a core component of successful crisis management and a means for maintaining a high 
level of preparedness. (pgs. 18-19) 
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Appendix C: Excerpts from “The Federal Code of Regulations” for Community Right-To-
Know and Nongovernmental Participation 
C.1 Title 40: Protection of Environment 
CHAPTER I: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY SUBCHAPTER J: 
SUPERFUND, EMERGENCY PLANNING, AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW 
PROGRAMS 
PART 300: NATIONAL OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES POLLUTION 
CONTINGENCY PLAN 
 
Subpart B 300.180: Responsibility and Organization for Response 
 
State and local participation in response.(a) Each state governor is requested to designate one 
state office/representative to represent the state on the appropriate RRT. The state's 
office/representative may participate fully in all activities of the appropriate RRT. Each state 
governor is also requested to designate a lead state agency that will direct state-lead response 
operations. This agency is responsible for designating the lead state response official for federal 
and/or state-lead response actions, and coordinating/communicating with any other state 
agencies, as appropriate. Local governments are invited to participate in activities on the 
appropriate RRT as may be provided by state law or arranged by the state's representative. Indian 
tribes wishing to participate should assign one person or office to represent the tribal government 
on the appropriate RRT. 
(b) Appropriate local and state officials (including Indian tribes) will participate as part of the 
response structure as provided in the ACP. 
(c) In addition to meeting the requirements for local emergency plans under SARA section 303, 
state and local government agencies are encouraged to include contingency planning for 
responses, consistent with the NCP, RCP, and ACP in all emergency and disaster planning. 
(d) For facilities not addressed under CERCLA or the CWA, states are encouraged to undertake 
response actions themselves or to use their authorities to compel potentially responsible parties 
to undertake response actions. 
(e) States are encouraged to enter into cooperative agreements pursuant to sections 104 (c)(3) 
and (d) of CERCLA to enable them to undertake actions authorized under subpart E of the NCP. 
Requirements for entering into these agreements are included in subpart F of the NCP. A state 
agency that acts pursuant to such agreements is referred to as the lead agency. In the event there 
is no cooperative agreement, the lead agency can be designated in a SMOA or other agreement. 
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(f) Because state and local public safety organizations would normally be the first government 
representatives at the scene of a discharge or release, they are expected to initiate public safety 
measures that are necessary to protect public health and welfare and that are consistent with 
containment and cleanup requirements in the NCP, and are responsible for directing evacuations 
pursuant to existing state or local procedures. 
Subpart B 300.185: Nongovernmental participation 
 
(a) Industry groups, academic organizations, and others are encouraged to commit resources for 
response operations. Specific commitments should be listed in the RCP and ACP. Those entities 
required to develop tank vessel and facility response plans under CWA section 311(j) must be 
able to respond to a worst case discharge to the maximum extent practicable, and shall commit 
sufficient resources to implement other aspects of those plans in accordance with the 
requirements of 30 CFR part 254, 33 CFR parts 150, 154, and 155; 40 CFR part 112; and 49 
CFR parts 171 and 194. 
(b) The technical and scientific information generated by the local community, along with 
information from federal, state, and local governments, should be used to assist the OSC/RPM in 
devising response strategies where effective standard techniques are unavailable. Such 
information and strategies will be incorporated into the ACP, as appropriate. The SSC may act as 
liaison between the OSC/RPM and such interested organizations. 
(c) ACPs shall establish procedures to allow for well organized, worthwhile, and safe use of 
volunteers, including compliance with CFR 300.150 regarding worker health and safety. ACPs 
should provide for the direction of volunteers by the OSC/RPM or by other federal, state, or local 
officials knowledgeable in contingency operations and capable of providing leadership. ACPs 
also should identify specific areas in which volunteers can be used, such as beach surveillance, 
logistical support, and bird and wildlife treatment. Unless specifically requested by the 
OSC/RPM, volunteers generally should not be used for physical removal or remedial activities. 
If, in the judgment of the OSC/RPM, dangerous conditions exist, volunteers shall be restricted 
from on-scene operations. 
(d) Nongovernmental participation must be in compliance with the requirements of subpart H of 
this part if any recovery of costs will be sought. 
 
